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1 Introduction
1.1 Preliminary Thoughts
In this subsection we layout the motivation of this research.
From the consumers’ perspective, one of the more promising aspects of e-commerce was that it
would reduce search costs. With search engines, consumers could easily observe and compare the prices
of a large number of vendors, and identify bargains.1 The consumers’ enhanced ability of comparing
prices would discipline vendors, and put downward pressure on prices.2
Presumably, the larger the number of vendors whose price a search engine lists on its site, and that
thereby consumers can easily compare, the more competitive the market becomes. However, there are
several technical reasons for search engines to cover only a small subset of the Internet, and to collect and
report information biased in favor of certain vendors. This perspective is discussed in Pereira (2004b)
and documented by several studies (Bradlow and Schmittlein (1999); Lawrence and Giles (1998, 1999)).
The technology-induced tendency, for search engines to have incomplete and biased coverage, is
reinforced by economic reasons. Search engines are profit-seeking institutions, which draw their income
from vendors, either in the form of placement fees, sales commissions, or advertising (Pereira (2004b)).
In this paper we examine theoretically and experimentally, the impact on consumer prices on elec-
tronic markets, of price comparison search engines covering only a small subset of the Internet, and
collecting and reporting information being biased in favor of certain vendors.
1A Search Engine is a program that accesses and reads Internet pages, stores the results, and returns lists of pages, which match
keywords in a query. It consists of three parts: (i) a crawler, (ii) an index, and (iii) the relevance algorithm. The Crawler, or
spider, is a program that automatically accesses Internet pages, reads them, stores the data, and then follows links to other
pages. The Index, or catalog, is a database that contains the information the crawler finds. The Relevance Algorithm is a program
that looks in the index formatches to keywords, and ranks them by relevance, which is determined through criteria such as link
analysis, or, click-through measurements. This description refers to crawler-based systems, such as Google or AltaVista. There
are also Directories, like Yahoo was initially, in which lists are compiled manually. Most systems are hybrid. Price Comparison
Search Engines, also known as shopping agents or shopping robots, are a class of search engines, which crawl commercial
Internet sites. In addition to addresses from vendors, they also collect and display other information like prices, or return
policies. There are also price comparison directories.
2The search literature has no simple prediction about the relation between search costs, price levels, or price dispersion (Pereira
(2004a); Samuelson and Zhang (1992)).
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1.2 Overview of the Paper
In this subsection we give an overview of the model and the paper’s main results.
We develop a partial equilibrium search model, related to Burdett and Judd (1983) and Varian (1980),
to discuss the implications of price comparison search engines providing consumers with incomplete
and biased information. There is: (i) a price comparison search engine, (ii) a finite number of identical
vendors, and (iii) a large number of consumers of two types. Shoppers use the price comparison search
engine, and buy at the lowest price listed by the search engine. Non-shoppers buy from a vendor chosen
at random. Vendors choose prices. In equilibrium, vendors randomize between charging a higher price
and selling only to non-shoppers, and charging a lower price to try to sell also to shoppers.
In the benchmark case the search engine has complete coverage, i.e., lists the prices of all vendors
present in the market. We also analyze two other cases. First, the case in which the price comparison
search engine has incomplete coverage, and is unbiased with respect to vendors. This case can be
thought of as portraying the situation where the search engine is a crawler-based system, which has no
placement deals with any particular vendor. Second, we analyze the case in which the price comparison
search engine has incomplete coverage, and is biased in favor of certain vendors. This case can be
thought of as portraying the situation where the search engine is either a crawler-based system or a
directory, which has placement deals with certain vendors. The search engines’ decisions of how many
vendors to index, or the vendors’ decisions of whether to become indexed, are obviously of interest.
Pereira (2004b) analyzes these questions. In this paper we take these decisions as given, and focus on
the implications for the pricing behavior of vendors.
The theoretical analysis makes several specific predictions regarding the impact of: (i) the number of
vendors, (ii) the size of the search engine, and (iii) the type of bias of the search engine. In addition, the
model also draws attention to four general counterintuitive effects. First, there is a conflict of interests
between types of consumers, i.e., between shoppers and non-shoppers. This makes it hard to evaluate
the welfare impact of these effects. Second, more information, measured by a wider Internet coverage
by the price comparison search engine, is not necessarily desirable. It benefits some consumers, but
harms others. Third, unbiased information about vendors is not necessarily desirable either, and for the
same reason. Fourth, the effects of entry in these markets are complex, and depend on the way entry
occurs.
We tested the predictions of the theoretical analysis, in a laboratory experiment designed specifically
to evaluate the model’s testable hypotheses. This included a parallel experiment, intended to capture
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two different aspects of risk attitudes: (i) the subjects’ degree of risk aversion, and (ii) whether subjects
accepted more risk in exchange for a higher return.
The experimental results confirmed the model’s predictions regarding the impact of the number of
firms, and the type of bias of the search engine, but reject the model’s predictions regarding changes in
the size of the index. The analysis of the data indicated several additional data patterns, such as that
prices are lower under biased incomplete coverage than under unbiased incomplete coverage. We also
developed an econometric model of the empirical price distributions. This lead us to a very interest-
ing empirical finding concerning risk attitudes. Introducing variables that account for the subjects’ risk
attitudes improved significantly the explanatory power of the econometric model. The implication of
this finding for future research is clear. If behavioral factors are systematically important in these mar-
kets, then they should be incorporated explicitly in the modelling assumptions. Otherwise models may
generate predictions that contrast with the empirical evidence.3
1.3 Literature Review
In this subsection we insert the paper in the literature.
Well before automated price comparison search engines appeared on the Internet, economists had
recognized the importance of buyers’ search costs for the functioning of oligopolistic markets. For ex-
ample, models like the one by Baye et al. (1992) demonstrate that any arbitrarily small search cost could
yield monopoly pricing by competing sellers.4 Obviously, there are alternative approaches in the lit-
erature which assume buyer heterogeneity as far as search costs are concerned. In the presence of
buyer heterogeneity mixed price equilibria may emerge. Such equilibria are often used as the theo-
retical counterpart of empirical evidence on persistent price dispersion. An interesting special case of
such heterogeneity is one in which for a fraction of the consumer population search is costless, whereas
the remaining population have identical positive search costs. Under this assumption, models like the
one in Stahl (1989) show that mixed strategy equilibrium price distributions range from monopoly to
competitive levels as the fraction of zero search cost buyers varies from 0 to 1.
Recently, the use of the Internet and the existence of price comparison search engines largely char-
acterize the properties of the search process followed by individual buyers. Specifically, buyers may be
heterogeneous depending on whether they gather price information on the Internet or not. This fact is
3Of course the role of behavioral factors can also be magnified in experimental laboratory in comparison with real-world
markets.
4On this matter, Diamond (1971), Varian (1980), Burdett and Judd (1983) and Stahl (1989) constitute important references.
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tested by empirical results reported by Iyer and Pazgal (2000). Furthermore, search engines may offer
incomplete or even biased coverage of competing firms’ prices, as reported in Kephart and Greenwald
(1999).
Baye andMorgan (2001) from a theoretical perspective, as well as Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) from
an empirical point of view, confirm the prediction of persistence price dispersion in Internet markets,
even in the presence of homogeneous products.
From an experimental perspective, two laboratory studies have explicitly tested the predictions of
theoretical search models with heterogeneous consumers. Cason and Friedman (2003) study markets
with costly buyer search. The issue of sample size used in the search process is explicitly addressed
allowing for both, human and automated, price search on the demand side. Theoretical predictions in
their model are mostly supported by the evidence.
In a different setup, much more similar to ours but assuming complete coverage, Morgan et al.
(2004) study the case of a consumer population consisting of Internet searchers and captive clients.
Some systematic deviations between theoretical and experimental results are attributed by the authors
to uncontrolled idiosyncratic features of their subjects. However, biases of price comparison search
engines and the effect of incompleteness, have been left unexplored.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the benchmark model,
and in Section 3 we characterize its equilibrium. In Section 4 we conduct the analysis of the model and
its variations. Section 5 analyzes the results of the experiment. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A, A,and
C, respectively, include the proofs, the experimental instructions and, and supplementary econometric
results .
2 The Model
In this section we present the benchmark model.
2.1 The Setting
Consider an electronic market for a homogeneous search good that opens for 1 period. There are:
(i) 1 price comparison search engine, (ii) n ≥ 3 vendors, which we index through subscript j = 1, . . . , n,
and (iii)many consumers.
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2.2 Price Comparison Search Engine
The Price-Comparison Search Engine, in response to a query for the product, lists the addresses of the
firms contained database, i.e., in its in its index, and the prices they charge. The search engine has 1 of 3
types: (i) Complete Coverage, (ii)Unbiased Incomplete Coverage, and (iii) Biased Incomplete Coverage. Denote
by τ the type of the search engine, and let ‘c’, mean Complete Coverage, ‘u’ mean Unbiased Incomplete
Coverage, and ‘b’ mean Biased Incomplete Coverage, i.e., τ belongs to {c, u, b}. We will use superscripts ‘c’,
‘u’, ‘b’, to denote variables or values associated with the cases where the search engine has that type.
2.2.1 Complete Coverage
Denote by k, the number of vendors the price-comparison search engine indexes. We will refer to k
as the Size of the Index. The search engine has Complete Coverage if it indexes all vendors present in the
market: k = n.
2.2.2 Unbiased Incomplete Coverage
The search engine has Incomplete Coverage if it does not index all vendors: 1 < k < n. In addition,
the search engine has an Unbiased Sample if it indexes each of the n vendors with the same probability:(n−1
k−1
)
/
(n
k
)
= k/n. When the search engine has incomplete coverage and an unbiased sample, we say
that it has Unbiased Incomplete Coverage.
2.2.3 Biased Incomplete Coverage
A search engine with incomplete coverage has a Biased Sample if it indexes vendors j = 1, . . . , k, and
does not index vendors j = k+ 1, . . . , n. When the search engine has incomplete coverage and a biased
sample, we say that it has Biased Incomplete Coverage. For this parameterization, knowing the probability
with which vendors are indexed, implies knowing the identity of the indexed vendors.5
5There are alternative ways of introducing sample biasedness, for which knowing the probability with which vendors are
indexed does not imply knowing the identity of the indexed vendors. For example, all vendors can be indexed with a non-
degenerate probability, which is higher for some vendors than for others. The advantage of our parameterization is that it
allows for a closed form solution.
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2.3 Consumers
There is a unit measure continuum of risk neutral consumers. Each consumer has a unit demand,
and a reservation price of 1. There are 2 types of consumers, which differ only with respect to whether
they use the price-comparison search engine. Non-Shoppers, a proportion λ in (0, 1) of the consumer
population, do not use the price-comparison search engine, perhaps because they are unaware of its
existence, or perhaps because of the high opportunity cost of their time.6 The other consumers, Shoppers,
use the price-comparison search engine.
Consumers do not know the prices charged by individual vendors. Shoppers use the price-compari-
son search engine to learn the prices of vendors. If the lowest price sampled by the price-comparison
search engine is no higher than 1, shoppers accept the offer and buy; in case of a tie they distribute
themselves randomly among vendors; otherwise they reject the offer and exit themarket. Non-shoppers
distribute themselves evenly across vendors, i.e., each vendor has a share of non-shoppers of 1/n. If
offered a price no higher than 1, non-shoppers accept the offer and buy; otherwise they reject the offer
and exit the market.
2.4 Vendors
Vendors are identical and risk neutral. Marginal costs are constant and equal to zero. Denote by
Πj(p), the expected profit of vendor j when it charges price p on R+0 . Vendors know the behavior rules
of the search engine. In particular, under Unbiased Incomplete Coverage, vendors know the probability
with which they are indexed, but do not observe the identity of the indexed vendors, before choosing
prices. Under Biased Incomplete Coverage, vendors know the identity of the indexed vendors before
choosing prices. In the cases ofComplete Coverage andUnbiased Incomplete Coverage, vendors are identical.
In the case of Biased Incomplete Coverage, vendors are asymmetric. A vendor’s strategy is a cumulative
distribution function over prices, Fj(·). Denote the lowest and highest prices on its support by
¯
pj and
6To use a search engine consumers might have to download software, learn how to use the search engine’s interface, configure
the interface, wait for the data to be downloaded, etc. These reasons might dissuade some consumers from using search
engines. This perspective agrees with the available evidence, which suggests a very limited use of price-comparison search
engines, at least yet. A Media Metrix study found that during July 2000 less than 4% of Internet users used a price-comparison
search engine, while over 67% visited an online retailer (Montgomery et al. (2001)). Furthermore, a Jupiter Communications
survey found that 28% of the respondents where unaware of the existence of price-comparison search engine (Iyer and Pazgal
(2000)).
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p¯j.7 A vendor’s payoff is its expected profit.
2.5 Equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium is a n-tuple of cumulative distribution functions over prices, {F1(·), . . . , Fn(·)},
such that for some Π?j on R
+
0 , and j = 1, . . . , n: (i) Πj(p) = Π
?
j , for all p on the support of Fj(·), and (ii)
Πj(p) ≤ Π?j , for all p.
When vendors are identical we focus on symmetric equilibria, in which case: Fj(·) = F(·),
¯
pj =
¯
p,
p¯j = p¯ and Π?j = Π
?, for all j.
3 Characterization of Equilibrium
In this section we construct the equilibrium of the model.
Denote by φτj the probability of firm j being indexed, given that the search engine is of type τ:
φτj =

k
n
⇐ τ = c, u
1 ⇐ τ = b and j = 1, . . . , k
0 ⇐ τ = b and j = k+ 1, . . . , n
Denote by pˆ−j the minimum price charged by any indexed vendor other than vendor j, and denote
by mˆ−j the number of indexed vendors that charge pˆ−j. The profit function of vendor j when it charges
price pj is:
pij(pj; τ) =

pj
(
λ
n
)
+ (1− λ)φτj ⇐ pj < pˆj ≤ 1
pj
(
λ
n
)
+
(
1− λ
mˆ−j
)
φτj ⇐ pj = pˆ−j ≤ 1
pj
(
λ
n
)
⇐ pˆj < pj ≤ 1
0 ⇐ 1 < pj
Ignoring ties,8 the expected profit of a vendor that charges p ≤ 1 is:9
Πj(p) = p
λ
n
+ p(1− λ)φτj [1− F(p)]k−1 (1)
7As it is well known this game has no equilibrium in pure strategies (Varian (1980)).
8Lemma 1: (ii) shows that Fτj (·) is continuous.
9Under Unbiased Incomplete Coverage, a vendor that charges a price p ≤ 1 sells to shoppers: (i) if it belongs to the set of vendors
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Denote by lτj the lowest price vendor j is willing to charge to sell to both types of consumers when
the search engine has type τ, i.e., lτj [λ/n+ (1− λ)φτj ]− λ/n ≡ 0.
The next Lemma states some auxiliary results.
Lemma 1 For all j: (i) lτj ≤
¯
pj ≤ p¯j ≤ 1; (ii) Fτj is continuous on [lτj , 1]; (iii) p¯j = 1; (iv) Π?j = λ/n; (v)
¯
pj = lτj ; (vi) F
τ
j has a connected support. §
From Lemma 1(iv), in equilibrium:
p
λ
n
+ p(1− λ)φτj [1− Fτj (p)]k−1 =
λ
n
(2)
Denote by δ(p), the degenerate distribution with unit mass on p.10 The next proposition character-
izes the equilibrium for the model.11
Proposition 1 (i) for τ = c, u and j = 1, . . . , n, and for τ = c and j = 1, . . . , k:
Fτj (p; n, k) =

0 ⇐ p < lτj
1−
[(
1
nφτj
)(
λ
1− λ
)(
1− p
p
)] 1k−1
⇐ lτj ≤ p < 1
1 ⇐ 1 ≤ p
with
lτj (n) =
λ
λ+ (1− λ)nφτj
.
(ii) for τ = b and j = k+ 1, . . . , n, Fbj (p; n, k) = δ(1). §
Under Biased Incomplete Coverage, vendors j = k + 1, . . . , n, are not indexed for sure, and therefore
have no access to shoppers. Since these vendors can only sell to non-shoppers, which are captive con-
indexed by price-comparison search engine, which occurs with probability k/n , and (ii) if it has the lowest price among the
indexed vendors, which occurs with probability [1− F(p)]k−1. Thus, the expected share of shoppers of a vendor that charges
price p ≤ 1 is: (1 − λ)(k/n)[1 − F(p)]k−1. Under Biased Incomplete Coverage, an indexed vendor that charges a price p ≤ 1
has the lowest price among the indexed vendors with probability [1− F(p)]k−1. Thus, the expected share of shoppers of an
indexed vendor that charges price p ≤ 1 is: (1− λ)[1− F(p)]k−1.
10Function δ(·) is the Dirac delta function.
11The equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is the unique symmetric equilibrium. Baye et al. (1992, Theorem 1, p. 496) showed
that there is also a continuum of asymmetric equilibria, where at least 2 firms randomize over [l, 1], with each other firm i
randomizing over [l, xi), xi < 1, and having a mass point at 1 equal to [1− Fi(xi)].
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sumers, they charge the reservation price. Vendors j = 1, . . . , k, under Biased Incomplete Coverage, and
all vendors in the cases Complete Coverage and Unbiased Incomplete Coverage, are indexed with positive
probability. Hence, they face the trade-off of charging a high price and selling only to non-shoppers, or
charging a low price to try to sell also to shoppers, which leads them to randomize over prices.
4 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the model for the 3 types of search engine.
4.1 Complete Coverage
In this subsection, we discuss the case of Complete Coverage.
In the case of Complete Coverage the model is similar to Varian (1980).12
Rewrite (2) as:
p(1− λ)[1− Fc(p)]n−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Benefit
=
λ
n
(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Opportunity Cost
(3)
If a vendor charges a price p lower than the consumers’ reservation price, it has the lowest price in the
market with probability [1− Fc(p)]n−1, sells to (1− λ) shoppers, and earns an additional expected profit
of p(1− λ)[1− Fc(p)]n−1: the Volume of Sales effect. However, it looses (1− p) per non-shopper, and a
total of (1 − p)λ/n: the per Consumer Profit effect. The volume of sales effect is the marginal benefit of
charging a price lower than the consumers’ reservation price, and the per consumer profit effect is the
marginal cost.
Denote by ε, the expected price, i.e., the expected price paid by non-shoppers. And denote by µ, the
expected minimum price, i.e., the expected price paid by shoppers.
The next Remark collects two useful observations.
Remark 1 (i) λεc + (1− λ)µc = λ; (ii) µc < εc. §
The first part of Remark 1 says that the average price paid in the market, λεc + (1 − λ)µc, equals
the proportion of non-shoppers, λ.13 This has two implications. First, only shifts in the proportion of
12See also Rosenthal (1980) and Stahl (1989).
13Actually, it equals the proportion of non-shoppers times the reservation price: λ · 1. Also, since marginal cost is 0, and demand
is inelastic and unitary, the average price paid in the market equals the average market profits.
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non-shoppers change the average price paid in the market. Second, shifts in any other parameter, such
as the number of vendors, n, induce the expected prices paid by shoppers and non-shoppers to move
in opposite directions. A conflict of interests between types of consumers is a recurring theme of this
paper.
The second part of Remark 1, says that the expected price paid by shoppers, µc = lc +
∫ 1
lc (1− Fc)ndp,
is lower than the expected price paid by non-shoppers, εc = lc +
∫ 1
lc (1− Fc)dp. The price-comparison
search engine allows shoppers to compare the prices of all vendors in its index, and choose the cheap-
est vendor. This induces competition among vendors and puts downward pressure on prices, which
benefits consumers that use search engines.
4.2 Unbiased Incomplete Coverage
In this subsection, we analyze the case of Unbiased Incomplete Coverage, and compare it with the
case of Complete Coverage. We show that Unbiased Incomplete Coverage compared with Complete Coverage,
increases the expected price paid by shoppers, and decreases the expected price paid by non-shoppers.
The price distribution for the case in which the market consists of n vendors, and the price-compari-
son search engine has an unbiased index of size k ≤ n, is identical to the price distribution for the case
in which the price-comparison search engine has Complete Coverage, k = n, and the market consists of k
vendors: Fu(·; n, k) = Fc(·; k). For further reference, we present this observation in the next corollary.
Corollary 1 Fu(·; n, k) = Fc(·; k). §
The next proposition analyzes the impact of changes in the size of the index, k, and the number of
vendors, n.
Proposition 2 (i) lu(k) < lu(k− 1); (ii) µu(n, k) < µu(n, k− 1) and εu(n, k) > εu(n, k− 1); (iii) Fu(·; n, k) =
Fu(·; n+ 1, k). §
Rewrite (2) as:
p(1− λ)
(
k
n
)
[1− Fu(p)]k−1 = λ
n
(1− p) (4)
From (4), an unbiased decrease in the size of the index has two impacts. First, for indexed vendors,
the decrease in the size of the index reduces the number of rivals with which a vendor has to compete
to sell to shoppers from k − 1 to k − 2. This increases the probability that an indexed vendor will have
11
FIGURE 1: Unbiased Incomplete Coverage
0 1
1
p
Fτ
lu(k)lc(n)
A
Fu(·; n, k)
Fc(·; n)
The first impact causes the distribution to shift from Fc(·; n) to A, and the second impact causes the distribution to shift from
A to Fu(·; n, k).
the lowest price, (1− Fu)k−1, which increases the Volume of Sales effect. The first impact leads vendors to
shift probability mass from higher to lower prices. As a consequence, the price distribution shifts to the
left (Figure 1). Second, the decrease in the size of the index reduces the probability that a given vendor is
indexed from k/n to (k− 1)/n, which reduces theVolume of Sales effect. The second impact leads vendors
to raise the lower bound of the support, and to shift probability mass from lower to higher prices. As
a consequence, the price distribution rotates (Figure 1). The total impact of an unbiased decrease in the
size of the index is to cause the price distribution to rotate counter clock-wise.14
The increase in the lower bound of the support, lu(k) < lu(k − 1), raises the expected price paid
by shoppers, µu(n, k) < µu(n, k − 1). However, from Remark 1 (i), the average price paid in the mar-
ket remains constant and equal to λ. This implies that the expected price by non-shoppers decreases,
εu(n, k) > εu(n, k− 1).15 Recall that vendors now charge lower prices with a higher probability. Shoppers
and non-shoppers have conflicting interests with respect to Unbiased Incomplete Coverage, as compared
14See Guimarães (1996) for a related discussion.
15See Morgan et al. (2004) for a related discussion.
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with Complete Coverage. Shoppers prefer a large to a small unbiased index, and non-shoppers prefer a
small to a large unbiased index.
UnderUnbiased Incomplete Coverage, the equilibrium price distribution does not depend on the num-
ber of vendors in the market, Fu(·; n, k) = Fu(·; n+ 1, k). This result is unexpected. The probability with
which a vendor is indexed, k/n, depends on the number of vendors. Besides, each vendor’s share of
non-shoppers, λ/n, also depends on the number of vendors. But from (4), n cancels out, and only the
number of vendors whose price shoppers compare matters. Rosenthal (1980) assumed that the increase
in the number of vendors is accompanied by a proportional increase in the measure of non-shoppers.
In his setting, an increase in the number of vendors induces first-order stochastically dominating shifts
in the price distribution, and therefore higher prices for both types of consumers. The contrast between
his and this result illustrates another recurring theme of this paper. In this sort of markets, the impact
of entry depends critically on the way entry occurs.
The next corollary compares the cases of Complete Coverage and Unbiased Incomplete Coverage.
Corollary 2 (i) lc(n) < lb(k); (ii) µc(n) < µu(n, k) and εc(n) > εu(n, k). §
Given that Fu(·; n, k) = Fc(·; k), comparing the price distributions under Unbiased Incomplete Cover-
age, Fu(·; n, k), and under Complete Coverage, Fc(·; n), is equivalent to comparing Fu(·; n, k) and Fu(·; n, n),
i.e., is equivalent to analyzing the impact of an increase in the size of the index, under Unbiased In-
complete Coverage. Thus, compared with Complete Coverage, Unbiased Incomplete Coverage causes the
price-comparison to rotate counter-clockwise, which increases the expected price paid by shoppers,
µc(n) < µu(n, k), and decreases the expected price paid by non-shoppers, εc(n) > εu(n, k).
4.3 Biased Incomplete Coverage
In this subsection, we analyze the case of Biased Incomplete Coverage, and compare it with the 2 pre-
vious cases. We show that Biased Incomplete Coverage, compared with both Unbiased Incomplete Coverage
and with Complete Coverage, decreases the expected price paid by shoppers and the non-shoppers that
buy from indexed vendors, and increases the expected price paid by non-shoppers that buy from non-
indexed vendors.
The next proposition analyzes the impact of changes in the size of the index, k, and the number of
vendors, n.
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FIGURE 2: Biased Incomplete Coverage: A Decrease in the Size of the Index
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For j = 1, . . . , k distributions Fbj (·; n, k− 1) are first-order stochastically dominated by distributions Fbj (·; n, k).
Proposition 3 (i) For j = 1, . . . , k, Fbj (·; n, k) ≤ Fbj (·; n, k− 1); (ii) µbj (n, k− 1) < µbj (n, k) and εbj (n, k− 1) ≤
εbj (n, k); (iii) For j = 1, . . . , k, F
b
j (·; n + 1, k) ≥ Fbj (·; n, k); (iv) µbj (n + 1, k) < µbj (n, k) and εbj (n + 1, k) ≤
εbj (n, k), with strict inequality for j = 1, . . . , k. §
Rewrite (2) as
p(1− λ)[1− Fbj (p)]k−1 =
λ
n
(1− p) (5)
From (5), a decrease in the size of a biased index, k, increases the probability that an indexed vendor
has the lowest price, (1− Fbj )k−1, which increases the Volume of Sales effect. This leads indexed vendors to
shift probability mass from higher to lower prices. As a consequence, the distribution shifts in the first-
order stochastically dominated sense, Fbj (p; n, k) ≤ Fbj (p; n, k− 1) (Figure 2). This decreases the expected
price paid by shoppers, µbj (n, k− 1) < µbj (n, k), and by non-shoppers that buy from an indexed vendor,
εbj (n, k− 1) < εbj (n, k), j = 1, . . . , k, and leaves unchanged the expected price paid by non-shoppers that
buy from a non-indexed vendor, εbj (n, k− 1) = εbj (n, k), j = k+ 1, . . . , n.
From (5), an increase in the number of vendors in the market, n, leaving fixed the size of a biased
14
FIGURE 3: Biased Incomplete Coverage: An Increase in the Number of Firms
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For j = 1, . . . , k distributions Fbj (·; n+ 1, k) are first-order stochastically dominated by distributions Fbj (·; n, k).
index, k, reduces the per Consumer Profit effect. This leads indexed vendors to reduce the lower bound of
the support, and to shift probabilitymass from higher to lower prices. As a consequence, the distribution
shifts in the first-order stochastically dominated sense, Fbj (p; n + 1, k) ≥ Fbj (p; n, k) (Figure 3). This
decreases the expected price paid by shoppers, µbj (n + 1, k) < µ
b
j (n, k), and by non-shoppers that buy
from an indexed vendor, εbj (n + 1, k) < ε
b
j (n, k), j = 1, . . . , k, and leaves unchanged the expected price
paid by non-shoppers that buy from a non-indexed vendor, εbj (n+ 1, k) = ε
b
j (n, k), j = k+ 1, . . . , n.
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The next corollary compares the case of Biased Incomplete Coverage, with the two previous cases.
Corollary 3 (i) lb(n) = lc(n); (ii) For j = 1, . . . , k, Fbj (·; n, k) ≥ max{Fc(·; n), Fu(·; n, k)}, and for j = k +
1, . . . , n, Fbj (·; n, k) ≤ min{Fc(·; n), Fu(·; n, k)}; (iii) µbj (n, k) < min{µc(n), µu(n, k)}; (iv) For j = 1, . . . , k,
εbj (n, k) < min{εc(n), εu(n, k)}, and for j = k+ 1, . . . , n, εbj (n, k) > max{εc(n), εu(n, k)}. §
For indexed vendors, Biased Incomplete Coverage involves only the positive impact on the Volume
16As n → +∞, lb → 0, and Fbj converges weakly to δ(1), j = 1, . . . , k.
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FIGURE 4: Comparison among the Three Types of Coverage
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For j = 1, . . . , k distributions Fbj (·; n, k) are first-order stochastically dominated by distributions Fc(·; n) and Fu(·; n, k).
of Sales effect, which leads vendors to shift probability mass from higher to lower prices. Thus, the
price distribution of indexed vendors, Fbj (·; n, k), is first-order stochastically dominated by price distri-
bution underComplete Coverage, Fc(·; n), and by the price distribution underUnbiased Incomplete Coverage
Fu(·; n, k) (Figure 4). Shoppers buy from the cheapest indexed vendor. Thus, the expected price paid
by shoppers is smaller under Biased Incomplete Coverage, than under either Complete Coverage, or Unbi-
ased Incomplete Coverage. For non-shoppers that buy from an indexed vendor, the expected price is also
smaller. For non-shoppers that buy from a non-indexed vendor, the expected price paid is higher.
5 Experimental Evidence
In this section, we describe the design and report the results of a laboratory experiment, developed
to test the theoretical model in the presence of human subjects.
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5.1 Main Experiment
In this subsection we describe the experimental design.
The experiment was conducted at the Laboratori d’Economia Experimental, LEE, of the Universitat
Jaume I, Castellón, Spain, during the summer 2004. A population of 144 subjects was recruited in
advance among the students of Business Administration, and other business-related courses taught
at this university.
The experiment was run under 8 treatments, each one consisting of a single session with 18 subjects.
Table 1 reports the design parameters of each treatment and the moments of the distributions of average
price and minimum price holding under the assumptions of the theoretical model presented in the pre-
vious sections. Each session consisted of the same setup repeated 50 periods. Each period, depending
on the treatment markets of 3 or 6 subjects were randomly formed. This strangers matching protocol
was adopted, in order to maintain the experimental environment as close as possible to the one-shot
framework of the theoretical model. Subjects were perfectly informed of the underlying model, and
their only decision variable in each period was price (see Appendix B). Nothing was said on the aims
of the experiment, and the alternative hypotheses. We programmed software using z-Tree (Fischbacher
(1999)) in order to organize strategy submission, demand simulation, feedback, and data collection.
Demand was simulated by the local network server. There were 1200 consumers. The consumers’
reservation price was normalized to 1000 rather than to 1, for representation and interface reasons, and
in order to offer a fine grid for subjects’ strategy space. Half of the consumers were shoppers, and the
other half were non-shoppers, i.e., we assumed that λ = 1/2.
Under Complete Coverage, the search engine’s index contained the prices of all subjects, i.e., k = n = 3
or k = n = 6, depending on the treatment. Under Incomplete Coverage, the index contained the prices of
only a subset of all subjects, i.e., k = 2 for n = 3, and k = 2 or k = 4 for n = 6. Under Unbiased Incomplete
Coverage, the subjects whose prices were indexed were chosen at random. Subjects were informed after
each period’s prices were set, of whether they where indexed. Under Biased Incomplete Coverage, for
k = 2, with n = 3 or n = 6, the prices of firms 1 and 2 were indexed, whereas for k = 4 and n = 6,
the prices of firms 1, 2, 3, 4 were indexed. Before each period’s prices were set, subjects participating
in treatments with Biased Incomplete Coverage were informed of whose prices would be indexed. Both
in the case of Unbiased or Biased Coverage, after each period’s prices were set, subjects were informed on
own and rival prices, as well as own quantities sold and profits earned.17
17We allow that subjects observe their rivals’ prices for two reasons. First, for realism. Second, because it helps subjects infer the
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TABLE 1: Design of Treatments
Treatment Design parameters Average prices Minimum prices
τ n k φτ Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1 c 3 3 1.00 0.605 0.143 0.395 0.145
2 u 3 2 0.67 0.549 0.103 0.451 0.113
3 b 3 2 1.00 0.462 0.135 0.359 0.113
4 c 6 6 1.00 0.708 0.125 0.292 0.167
5 u 6 4 0.67 0.648 0.115 0.352 0.158
6 b 6 4 1.00 0.587 0.154 0.275 0.152
7 u 6 2 0.33 0.549 0.073 0.451 0.113
8 b 6 2 1.00 0.324 0.137 0.225 0.099
τ is the type of search engine: ‘c’ means Complete Coverage; ‘u’ means Unbiased Incomplete Coverage, and ‘b’ means Biased
Incomplete Coverage. n is the number of firms present in each market. k is the size of the search engine index. φτ is the
probability with which a firm is indexed by the search engine. The last four columns report the mean and the standard
deviation of the theoretical distributions of average prices and minimum prices. Note that in treatments with biased sampling,
τ = b, only firms with non-null probability of being indexed are considered.
In order to make the earnings of each period equally interesting, subjects’ monetary rewards were
calculated from the cumulative earnings over 10 randomly selected periods. Individual rewards ranged
between 15 € and 50 €. This made the experiment worth participating in, and made trying to have the
highest payoff worthwhile.
The 20 initial periods were dropped from the data sets used in the empirical analysis, to eliminate
learning dynamics, and guarantee that observations had reached the necessary stability.
5.2 Parallel Experiment
Our theoretical model assumed risk neutrality. However, a similar experiment reported in Morgan
et al. (2004) has shown a systematic deviation of the experimental data from the theoretical predictions.
The authors conjectured —without explicitly accounting for this in their design— that the subjects’
attitudes towards risk should be the cause of this deviation. Risk attitudes are likely to matter in our
framework, for two reasons. First, because, similar to Morgan et al. (2004), depending on rival indexed
types of strategies that are adopted and abandoned by the rest of the market, which speeds convergence.
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prices, subjects have random sales. Second, because in our unbiased incomplete coverage treatments,
subjects are indexed randomly. Following these conjectures, in addition to themain experiment, subjects
were faced with a parallel experiment, whose aims and design are described next.
In order to account for risk attitudes, we have used the lottery panel test proposed by Sabater and
Georgantzís (2002). Our objective is to use the data obtained from the test as an explanatory factor of
any systematic divergence between observed behavior and theoretical predictions. The test is designed
to elicit two dimensions of the subjects’ risk attitudes. First, the subjects’ degree of risk aversion. And
second, whether subjects accepted more risk in exchange for a higher expected return.
Following a standard protocol used in the LEE, when registering in our subject pool, subjects had
participated previously in the following experiment. They were offered the 4 panels of lotteries in
Table 2, involving a probability q of earning a monetary reward of X €, and a probability 1 − q of
earning 0 €. Each one of the 4 panels was constructed using a fixed certain payoff, c = 1 €, above
which expected earnings, qX, were increased by a ratio h times the probability of not winning, 1 − q,
as implied by the formula: qX = c+ h(1− q). That is, an increase in the probability of the unfavorable
outcome is linearly compensated by an increase in the expected payoff. We used 4 different risk return
parameters, h = 0.1, 1, 5, 10, implying an increase in the return of risky choices as we moved from one
panel to the next. Simple inspection of the panels shows that risk loving and risk neutral subjects would
choose q = 0.1 in all panels.18 The more risk averse a subject is, the lower the risk he will assume, i.e.,
the higher the q he would choose. For risk-averse subjects, their sensitivity to the attraction implied
by a higher h was approximated by the difference in their choices across subsequent panels.19 More
specifically, we have considered the sign of transitions across panels as a qualitative variable referring
to a subject’s tendency to comply, in the case of a negative transition, with the pattern of assuming more
risk in the presence of a higher risk return. For labelling purposes, we refer to this pattern of behavior as
Monotonicity. While measures of local risk aversion are commonly obtained from binary lottery tests,20
this second aspect of behavior captured by the test concerns a subject’s responses to changes in the
18Risk neutrality and risk-loving behavior are observationally impossible to distinguish from our test.
19In fact, using the utility function U(x) = x1/t, it can be shown that the optimal probability corresponding to an Expected
Utility maximizing subject is given by q? = (1− (1/t))(1+ (c/r)). Apart from illustrating the panel-specific positive relation
between the probability chosen and a subject’s risk aversion, this would imply that subjects should choose weakly (given the
discreteness of the design) lower probabilities as we move from one panel to the next one. However, using more general utility
functions or non Expected Utility theories, one can easily construct counterexamples of the aforementioned choice pattern.
20For example, Holt and Laury (2002) use binary lottery choice tasks, in order to obtain the parameter r of the utility function,
U(x) = x1−r/(1− r).
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TABLE 2: Panels for the Parallel Experiment
Panel 1
q 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
X € 1.00 1.12 1.27 1.47 1.73 2.10 2.65 3.56 5.40 10.90
Choice
Panel 2
q 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
X € 1.00 1.20 1.50 1.90 2.30 3.00 4.00 5.70 9.00 19.00
Choice
Panel 3
q 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
X € 1.00 1.66 2.50 3.57 5.00 7.00 10.00 15.00 25.00 55.00
Choice
Panel 4
q 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
X € 1.00 2.20 3.80 5.70 8.30 12.00 17.50 26.70 45.00 100
Choice
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expected profitability of riskier choices.
Subjects were informed that after submitting their four choices, one per panel, a four-sided die
would be used to determine which panel was binding. Following this stage, a ten-sided die was used to
determine whether the subject would receive the corresponding payoff or not, depending on the odds
corresponding to the subject’s choice in the panel drawn.
5.3 Testable Implications
In this subsection we present the hypotheses to be tested, expressed in terms of our experimental
design.
Denote by εt, the expected price in treatment t; by εint the expected price of indexed firms in treatment
t; by εnit the expected price of non-indexed firms in treatment t; by µt the expected minimum price in
treatment t, where t = 1, . . . , 8.
We perform the following Consistency Test:
HC: Under Complete Coverage, an increase in the number of vendors: (i) increases the average price: ε4 > ε1;
(ii) decreases the expected minimum price: µ4 < µ1.
Regarding Unbiased Incomplete Coveragewe test:
HU1: Under Unbiased Incomplete Coverage, a decrease in the size of the index: (i) increases the expected mini-
mum price: µ4 < µ5 < µ7 and µ1 < µ2; (ii) decreases the expected price: ε4 > ε5 > ε7 and ε1 > ε2.
HU2: Under Unbiased Incomplete Coverage, the equilibrium price distribution is independent of the number of
vendors present in the market: µ2 = µ7 and ε2 = ε7.
Regarding Biased Incomplete Coveragewe test:
HB1: Under Biased Incomplete Coverage, a decrease in the size of the index: (i) decreases the expected minimum
price: µ4 > µ6 > µ8 and µ1 > µ3; (ii) decreases the expected price of indexed vendors: ε4 > εin6 > ε
in
8 and
ε1 > ε
in
3 ; (iii) leaves unchanged the expected price of non-indexed vendors: ε
ni
6 = ε
ni
8 = 1 and ε
ni
3 = 1.
HB2: Under Biased Incomplete Coverage, an increase in the number of vendors present in the market: (i) decreases
the expected minimum price: µ3 > µ8; (ii) decreases the expected price of indexed vendors: εin3 > ε
in
8 .
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We also test:
HG: (i) The expected minimum price is smaller under Biased Incomplete Coverage, than under Unbiased Incom-
plete Coverage: µ5 > µ6 and µ7 > µ8 and µ2 > µ3; (ii) The expected price of indexed vendors is smaller
under Biased Incomplete Coverage, than under Unbiased Incomplete Coverage: ε5 > εin6 , and ε7 > ε
in
8 , and
ε2 > ε
in
3 .
5.4 Results: Descriptive Analysis
In this subsection we analyze the experimental data.
Table 3 summarizes the information and descriptive statistics regarding all treatments. Seven con-
clusions emerge from the descriptive statistics.
Observation 1 There is a systematic deviation of the empirical results from the theoretical results. §
This conclusion can be reached through at least two alternative ways. First, the inspection of Table 4
shows that with the exception of the average price for treatments 4 and 6, all estimatedmeans of average
andminimum prices are significantly different from their theoretical values, which are shown in Table 1.
TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics
Treatment Average prices Minimum prices Obs.
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1 0.535 0.158 0.294 0.103 180
2 0.760 0.109 0.635 0.157 180
3 0.637 0.211 0.475 0.247 180
4 0.700 0.136 0.193 0.161 90
5 0.592 0.149 0.204 0.197 90
6 0.591 0.177 0.208 0.176 90
7 0.758 0.088 0.644 0.258 90
8 0.416 0.214 0.269 0.187 90
Means and standard deviations of the empirical distributions of average and minimum prices. In the biased treatments, 3, 6
and 8, only indexed firms are considered.
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TABLE 4: t-tests of Equality of Price Distribution Means to their Theoretical Values
Treatment Average prices Minimum prices d. f.
1 −5.90 [0.00] −13.14 [0.00] 179
2 25.84 [0.00] 15.68 [0.00] 179
3 11.13 [0.00] 6.35 [0.00] 179
4 −0.58 [0.56] 9.98 [0.00] 89
5 −3.52 [0.00] −7.17 [0.00] 89
6 0.19 [0.85] −3.64 [0.00] 89
7 22.52 [0.00] 7.10 [0.00] 89
8 4.06 [0.00] 2.21 [0.03] 89
Two-sided t-tests with ‘d. f.’ degrees of freedom (p-values between brackets). The means of the theoretical distribution of
average prices and minimum prices are reported in Table 1. In the biased treatments, 3, 6 and 8, only indexed firms are
considered.
Second, this conclusion can also be gleaned from the inspection of Figure 5, which compares the
empirical and theoretical distributions of prices fixed by subjects that had a non null probability of
being indexed by the search engine. In Figure 5, each empirical price distribution is surrounded with a
confidence region built from the 1% critical values of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. As none of those
confidence regions include the whole theoretical distribution, the observed price distributions are not
compatible with the theoretical ones.21
The empirical distributions rotate clock-wise compared to the theoretical distributions. In the case
of treatments 2 and 3, the empirical distribution “almost” first-order stochastically dominates the theo-
retical distribution. The rotation of the empirical distributions indicates the presence of more density at
both tails of distributions of observed prices, than the theoretical model would have predicted. In fact,
in some treatments a large number of observations lie below of the infimum of the support of the theo-
retical distributions, lτ, e.g., in treatments 1, 4, 5 and 6. And in addition, a large number of observations
are at the maximum price, pj = 1. This behavior is specially pronounced in treatments 4, 5, 6, and 7,
21As is well known, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic is the maximum of the absolute value of the difference between the
two distributions being compared. Therefore, as none of the theoretical distributions completely lies in the confidence regions
of Figure 5, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the theoretical and empirical distributions
in all cases.
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where p = 1 is an accumulation point of the empirical distributions.22 In line with the way in which the
empirical distributions rotate, all of the empirical price distributions have higher standard deviations
than the corresponding theoretical ones (see Tables 1 and 3).
We also have found a difference between the expected and the observed behavior of subjects that
knew beforehand that they would not be indexed under Biased Incomplete Coverage. In treatments 6 and
8, 8% of the observed prices of these subjects were different from pj = 1. We suspect that many of these
observations were mistakes, as many of these subjects only deviated from the degenerate equilibrium
strategy once or twice. But in treatment 3, nearly 30% of the prices of these subjects were different from
pj = 1, and four of these individuals always choose prices lower than pj = 1. Clearly, the experimental
data does not support hypothesisHB1 (iii).
Observation 2 The data supports the model’s predictions regarding changes in the number of firms present in
the market. §
From Tables 5 and 6, it follows that: (i) µ2 = µ7 and ε2 = ε7, (ii) µ3 > µ8 and εin3 > ε
in
8 , (iii) µ1 > µ4
and ε1 < ε4. This implies that the data supports hypotheses: HC, HU2, and HB2.
Consider in particular the consistency test, HC: under Complete Coverage, an increase in the number
of vendors increases the average price and decreases the expected minimum price. This conclusion can
also be gleaned from the inspection of Figure 6. This non-trivial result was also obtained by Morgan
et al. (2004).
Observation 3 The data supports the model’s predictions regarding the comparison between Unbiased Incom-
plete Coverage and Biased Complete Coverage. §
FromTables 5 and 6, it follows that: (i) µ3 < µ2 and εin3 < ε2, (ii) µ6 = µ5 and ε
in
6 = ε5, (iii) µ8 < µ7 and
εin8 < ε7. The data support hypothesisHG. This implies that the average price and the averageminimum
price are weakly lower under Biased Incomplete Coverage than under Unbiased Incomplete Coverage. Both
types of consumers, shoppers and non-shoppers, are better off if the index is biased than if it is unbiased.
The same conclusion can be gleaned from the inspection of Figure 7.
Observation 4 The data does not support the model’s predictions regarding changes in the size of the index. §
22This finding could be interpreted in terms of the asymmetric equilibrium referenced in footnote 11.
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TABLE 5: t-tests of Equality of Means of Average Prices
H0 H1 d. f. t-test p-value
HC ε1 = ε4 ε1 < ε4 268 −8.44 0.00
HU1 ε5 = ε4 ε5 < ε4 178 −5.06 0.00
ε7 = ε4 ε7 < ε4 178 3.42 1.00
ε7 = ε5 ε7 < ε5 178 9.11 1.00
ε2 = ε1 ε2 < ε1 358 15.68 1.00
HU2 ε2 = ε7 ε2 6= ε7 268 0.11 0.91
HB1 εin6 = ε4 ε
in
6 < ε4 178 −4.64 0.00
εin8 = ε4 ε
in
8 < ε4 178 −10.60 0.00
εin8 = ε
in
6 ε
in
8 < ε
in
6 178 −5.96 0.00
εin3 = ε1 ε
in
3 < ε1 358 5.19 1.00
HB2 εin8 = ε
in
3 ε
in
8 < ε
in
3 268 −8.07 0.00
HG εin6 = ε5 ε
in
6 < ε5 178 −0.07 0.47
εin8 = ε7 ε
in
8 < ε7 178 −14.01 0.00
εin3 = ε2 ε
in
3 < ε2 358 −6.93 0.00
Except for HU2, one-sided t-tests with ‘d.f’ degrees of freedom. The testable implications of section 5.3 correspond to the
alternative hypothesis of these tests. For HU2, two-sided t-test with ‘d.f’ degrees of freedom. HU2 correspond to the null
hypothesis of this test.
From Tables 5 and 6, it follows that: (i) µ1 < µ2 and ε1 < ε2, (ii) µ4 < µ7 and ε4 < ε7, (iii) µ5 < µ7
and ε5 < ε7, (iv) µ4 = µ5 and ε4 > ε5. This implies that the data does not support hypothesisHU1.
Also from Tables 5 and 6, it follows that: (i) µ1 < µ3 and ε1 < εin3 , (ii) µ4 < µ8 and ε4 > ε
in
8 , (iii)
µ6 < µ8 and εin6 > ε
in
8 , (iv) µ4 = µ6 and ε4 > ε
in
6 . This implies that the data does not support hypothesis
HB1, either.
Observation 5 The data does not support the model’s predictions regarding the comparison between Complete
Coverage and Incomplete Coverage. §
With respect to the comparison between Complete Coverage and Unbiased Incomplete Coverage, from
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TABLE 6: t-tests of Equality of Means of Minimum Prices
H0 H1 d.f. t-test p-value
HC µ4 = µ1 µ4 < µ1 268 −6.23 0.00
HU1 µ4 = µ5 µ4 < µ5 178 −0.39 0.34
µ4 = µ7 µ4 < µ7 178 −14.06 0.00
µ5 = µ7 µ5 < µ7 178 −12.87 0.00
µ1 = µ2 µ1 < µ2 358 −24.26 0.00
HU2 µ2 = µ7 µ2 6= µ7 268 −0.35 0.72
HB1 µ6 = µ4 µ6 < µ4 178 0.59 0.72
µ8 = µ4 µ8 < µ4 178 2.91 1.00
µ8 = µ6 µ8 < µ6 178 2.25 0.99
µ3 = µ1 µ3 < µ1 358 9.09 1.00
HB2 µ8 = µ3 µ8 < µ3 268 −7.00 0.00
HG µ6 = µ5 µ6 < µ5 178 0.15 0.56
µ8 = µ7 µ8 < µ7 178 −11.17 0.00
µ3 = µ2 µ3 < µ2 358 −7.30 0.00
Except for HU2, one-sided t-tests with ‘d.f’ degrees of freedom. The testable implications of section 5.3 correspond to the
alternative hypothesis of these tests. For HU2, two-sided t-test with ‘d.f’ degrees of freedom. HU2 correspond to the null
hypothesis of this test.
Tables 5 and 6, it follows that: (i) µ4 = µ5 < µ7 and µ1 < µ2; (ii) ε5 < ε4 < ε7 and ε1 < ε2. Only the
comparison of minimum prices is weakly compatible with the model’s predictions. The data fails to
support the predicted comparison between Complete Coverage and Unbiased Incomplete Coverage.
With respect to the comparison between Complete Coverage and Biased Incomplete Coverage, from Ta-
bles 5 and 6, it follows that: (i) µ4 = µ6 < µ8 and µ1 < µ3; (ii) εin8 = ε
in
6 < ε4 and ε1 < ε
in
3 . The data fails
to support the predicted comparison between Complete Coverage and Biased Incomplete Coverage.
Observation 6 The average minimum price is weakly lower under Complete Coverage than under Biased Incom-
plete Coverage. §
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FIGURE 6: Comparison of Price Cumulative Distributions: Treatments 1 (solid line) and 4 (dashed line).
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From Table 6 it follows that: (i) µ1 < µ3, (ii) µ4 = µ6, and (iii) µ4 < µ8. Jointly with Observation 3,
this imply that shoppers are better off under Complete Coverage than under Incomplete Coverage.
Observation 7 Given the type of bias, ratio k/n, and Incomplete Coverage, an increase in the number of firms
in the market leads to a lower average price, and a lower average minimum price. §
From Tables 5 and 6 it follows that: (i) µ5 < µ2 and ε5 < ε2, and (ii) µ6 < µ3 and ε6 < ε3. This
observation agrees with the empirical findings of Baye et al. (2003).
We interpret these observations as follows. On the basis of descriptive analysis alone, the data sup-
ports some of the model’s predictions, and rejects others. Given that some of the predictions that the
data supports are non-trivial, particularly the consistency test, HC, the underlying Burdett and Judd
(1983) and Varian (1980) model is sound. However, there is some factor, the model does not account
for, that impacts systematically the way subjects play the game. In the case of Complete Coverage this
unaccounted factor is qualitatively unimportant. However, under Incomplete Coverage this unaccounted
factor becomes determinant. The model assumes that subjects are risk neutral, expected utility maxi-
mizers. The unaccounted factor could be the subjects’ risk attitudes.
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FIGURE 7: Comparison of Price Distributions
(a) Treatments 2 (solid) and 3 (dashed)
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(b) Treatments 2 (solid) and 3 (dashed)
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(c) Treatments 5 (solid) and 6 (dashed)
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(d) Treatments 5 (solid) and 6 (dashed)
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0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
29
5.5 Results: Accounting for Risk Attitudes
In this subsection we analyze risk attitudes. As already said, for the purposes of our analysis we
focus on two aspects of observed behavior: (i) the average choice over the four panels, and (ii) the
“transition” across two subsequent panels. The former is a proxy for a subject’s risk aversion, and the
latter a qualitative variable reflecting a subject’s compliance with the monotonicity property.
Table 7 summarizes the information and descriptive statistics regarding the parallel experiment for
all treatments. Next to each treatment’s number, we provide the percentage of choices which are com-
patible with risk neutrality (Risk Neutr. column) and the average choice by all subjects in the treatment
over all panels (Avr. Choice). The remaining columns refer to percentages of subjects fulfilling the mono-
tonicity property at three different levels: Strict, requiring that a subject’s choices are all compatible with
the pattern of a riskier choice in the presence of a higher return to risk; Average, requiring that, on av-
erage, a subject’s choices follow the aforementioned pattern; and Local, requiring a negative transition
from panel 1 to panel 2 alone.
Now we can formulate two testable hypotheses related to our subjects’ risk attitudes:
HRA: Subjects are risk neutral, i.e., subjects choose q = 0.1.
HM: Subjects will choose an equally risky or a riskier option in the presence of higher returns to risk. That is,
across panels, as the return to risk is increased, subjects choose a no higher q.
From Table 7, one concludes the following. Our results confirm previous findings of choice agglom-
eration around probabilities close to 0.5 (Georgantzís et al. (2003)). Specifically, Table 7 indicates that the
average choices exhibit no systematic patterns across treatments. Overall, slightly less than 10% of the
decisions would be compatible with risk neutrality in any one of the panels. However, this percentage
falls below any significance level if we require that a subject behaved in a way compatible with risk
neutrality in all four panels .
It is straightforward to conclude that:
Observation 8 The data does not support the hypothesis that subjects are risk neutral. §
As we said, the column labelled Strict in Table 7 presents the percentage of subjects whose choice
across panels confirms the prediction that a higher risk return induces riskier options. Such percentage
varies from one treatment to the other, ranging from 27.7% in treatment 2 to 55.5%, in treatment 4.
Overall, only 38% of our subjects follow this pattern. Requiring that this pattern is observed only as an
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TABLE 7: Parallel Experiment Results
Treatment Risk Neutr. Avr. Choice Monotonicity compliance measures
Strict Average Local
1 1.39 0.59 44.44 72.22 77.78
2 15.28 0.46 27.78 77.78 38.89
3 4.17 0.54 33.33 55.56 55.56
4 20.83 0.44 55.56 88.89 83.33
5 5.56 0.59 33.33 77.78 72.22
6 5.56 0.52 33.33 66.67 66.67
7 8.33 0.59 33.33 66.67 55.56
8 18.06 0.50 50.00 77.78 61.11
Average 9.90 0.53 38.89 72.92 63.89
average behavior, over the four panels, because human errors might induce inconsistent transition from
a given panel to the next one, raises the percentage of Monotonicity-compatible subjects over the whole
population up to 72.9% (this Average monotonicity compliance measure of Table 7). Following specific
utility functions used in expected utility generalizations, one should also look at local behavior (Local),
which can be done by looking at the transition from panel 1 to 2, in which the minimum increase in the
risk-return payoff has been used. The fifth column of the Table shows that only 63.9% of our subjects
have fulfilled monotonicity.
Therefore:
Observation 9 The data does not support the hypothesis that subjects will accept more risk in lottery-panels
offering a higher return to risk. §
5.6 Estimation of Price Distributions
Our theoretical model gives us clear predictions under homogeneity of subjects’ utility functions,
and risk neutrality. Having established the violation of these hypotheses, we need a tool to assess its
impact on experimental results. Our strategy consists of estimating price distributions conditional on
treatment-specific or design parameter-specific variates, on one hand, and, individual-specific charac-
teristics related to risky choice, on the other hand. From the estimated price distribution we can derive
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the distributions of both average and minimum prices and assess the impact of design parameters and
risk attitudes on these distributions.
We model the observed prices as coming from beta distributions. The beta distribution is commonly
used in the statistical analysis of variables with a bounded support. It is a flexible distribution which
can accommodate asymmetries and various distributional shapes: uniform, bell-shaped, U-shaped, J-
shaped. As it is a distribution for bounded variables, it naturally incorporates a relation between mean
and variance, so that, for unimodal distributions, the variance is lower for beta variables with a mean
near the boundaries than for beta variables whose mean lies around the center of the support. Finally,
the mathematical tractability of the beta distribution generally puts no excessive burden on the estima-
tion and interpretability of the results.
We allow some degree of heterogeneity by doing the estimation conditional on a set of K covariates,
xi = (x1i, x2i, . . . , xKi)′, where subscript i = 1, . . . ,N indexes the experimental observations. In our
analysis, these covariates are related to the design of each treatment and to the risk attitudes of the
subjects. We parametrize a price distribution in terms of its conditional mean, E(p|xi) = Θi = Θ(xi),
and a function ∆i = ∆(xi) inversely related to dispersion.23 Given these definitions, the probability
distribution function of prices is
f (p|xi) = Γ(∆i)Γ(∆iΘi)Γ((1−Θi)∆i) p
∆iΘi−1(1− p)(1−Θi)∆i−1 (6)
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, and Γ(·) is the gamma function. We use the following functional forms for the mean
and the dispersion:
Θi = Λ(x′iθ) (7)
∆i = exp(x′iδ) (8)
where Λ(s) = 1/(1 + e−s) is the logit function, and θ and δ are K-dimensional vectors of unknown
parameters. The functional forms (7) and (8) guarantee that Θi lies between 0 an 1 and ∆i is greater than
0, for all possible values of the parameters, θ, δ, and the covariates, xi. Equations (6)–(8) allow us to
write the logarithm of the likelihood function as
ln L =
N
∑
i=1
ln f (p|xi) (9)
23Perhaps, it would be more natural to parametrize the price distribution in terms of its conditional mean and its variance.
But this would complicate both the estimation procedure and the interpretation of estimates. This is so, due to the nonlinear
relationship between the mean and the upper bound of the variance of a beta distributed variable. In any case, knowing Θi
and ∆i we can compute the variance as σ2i = Θi(1−Θi)/(∆i + 1). Thus, given Θi, higher values of ∆i imply lower variances.
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TABLE 8: Descriptive Statistics ofMON and RISK
Treatment MON q¯ (All subjects) q¯ (MON) q¯ (non-MON)
1 0.78 (0.43) 0.59 (0.14) 0.61 (0.23) 0.53 (0.31)
2 0.39 (0.50) 0.46 (0.19) 0.51 (0.26) 0.43 (0.24)
3 0.56 (0.51) 0.54 (0.18) 0.62 (0.26) 0.44 (0.23)
4 0.83 (0.38) 0.44 (0.23) 0.39 (0.24) 0.68 (0.51)
5 0.72 (0.46) 0.59 (0.20) 0.55 (0.23) 0.71 (0.42)
6 0.67 (0.49) 0.52 (0.15) 0.57 (0.23) 0.43 (0.21)
7 0.56 (0.51) 0.59 (0.17) 0.62 (0.27) 0.54 (0.28)
8 0.61 (0.50) 0.50 (0.21) 0.50 (0.31) 0.50 (0.23)
All 0.64 (0.48) 0.53 (0.19) 0.54 (0.20) 0.51 (0.19)
Sample means and, between parentheses, standard deviations of the dummy variable MON, wich takes value 1 for subjects
fulfilling the local monotonicity compliance measure of Table 7, and q¯, which is the average choice in the parallel experiment.
The last two columns report the sample statistics of q¯ for the subsamples defined by the compliance or non-compliance of the
monotonicity hypothesis.
The estimation of unknown parameters is performed by maximizing (9) with respect to θ and δ. These
parameters are positively related to the marginal effects of a covariate on the mean and dispersion of
prices. Consider a change of covariate xli. It is easy to see that
∂Θi
∂xli
= Θi(1−Θi)θl
∂∆i
∂xli
= ∆iδl
So the marginal effect on the mean (dispersion) varies at different points of the distribution, but the sign
is the same as the sign of θl (δl).24
In our analysis, we distinguish between two types of subjects —labelled as MON and non-MON,
respectively— according to the subject’s compliance with the prediction that higher risk returns induce
riskier options. This is done by checking whether a subject has chosen a weakly lower probability in
24The impact on the variance is more complicated to analyze as it depends on two distinct effects which can have different signs:
∂σ2
∂xli
= σ2
[
(1− 2Θi)θl −
∆i
1+ ∆i
δl
]
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TABLE 9: Estimations of Price Distribution
Model I Model II Model III
All subjects All subjects MON non-MON
θ1 0.510
[0.047]
∗∗ 0.779
[0.083]
∗∗ 0.555
[0.099]
∗∗ 1.272
[0.197]
∗∗
θ2 1.315
[0.042]
∗∗ 1.537
[0.071]
∗∗ 1.042
[0.098]
∗∗ 2.326
[0.141]
∗∗
θ3 0.793
[0.056]
∗∗ 1.042
[0.085]
∗∗ 0.858
[0.117]
∗∗ 1.596
[0.173]
∗∗
θ4 1.033
[0.051]
∗∗ 1.235
[0.075]
∗∗ 1.058
[0.080]
∗∗ 2.048
[0.236]
∗∗
θ5 0.696
[0.048]
∗∗ 0.963
[0.087]
∗∗ 0.692
[0.100]
∗∗ 1.904
[0.223]
∗∗
θ6 0.716
[0.057]
∗∗ 0.967
[0.087]
∗∗ 0.664
[0.109]
∗∗ 1.743
[0.179]
∗∗
θ7 1.259
[0.056]
∗∗ 1.528
[0.090]
∗∗ 1.343
[0.112]
∗∗ 2.263
[0.198]
∗∗
θ8 0.056
[0.095]
0.282
[0.109]
∗ 0.124
[0.126]
0.978
[0.215]
∗∗
θr −0.154
[0.040]
∗∗ 0.016
[0.048]
−0.652
[0.098]
∗∗
δ1 0.211
[0.036]
∗∗ 0.262
[0.057]
∗∗ 0.077
[0.058]
1.182
[0.218]
∗∗
δ2 0.772
[0.032]
∗∗ 0.820
[0.047]
∗∗ 0.924
[0.084]
∗∗ 1.168
[0.128]
∗∗
δ3 0.340
[0.040]
∗∗ 0.391
[0.054]
∗∗ 0.168
[0.064]
∗ 1.096
[0.140]
∗∗
δ4 −0.258
[0.026]
∗∗ −0.201
[0.045]
∗∗ −0.302
[0.042]
∗∗ 0.464
[0.204]
∗
δ5 −0.243
[0.025]
∗∗ −0.182
[0.047]
∗∗ −0.331
[0.049]
∗∗ 0.531
[0.182]
∗∗
δ6 −0.232
[0.025]
∗∗ −0.175
[0.047]
∗∗ −0.326
[0.053]
∗∗ 0.377
[0.144]
∗
δ7 0.339
[0.046]
∗∗ 0.411
[0.065]
∗∗ 0.358
[0.064]
∗∗ 0.948
[0.193]
∗∗
δ8 0.224
[0.099]
∗ 0.268
[0.105]
∗ 0.300
[0.124]
∗ 0.645
[0.231]
∗∗
δr −0.034
[0.025]
0.039
[0.026]
−0.354
[0.092]
∗∗
RMSE 0.318 0.318 0.315
ln L 3288.4 3293.1 3347.6
LR 118.4∗∗ 109.0∗∗
K 16 18 36
Maximum-likelihood estimates of parameters in equations (10) and (11). White’s (1982) robust standard errors between brack-
ets. Sample size is 3600 observations. RMSE is the root mean squared prediction error, ln L is the value of the likelihood
function, LR is the likelihood ratio statistic comparing each Model with Model III, K is the number of parameters estimated in
each model. Coefficients marked with ∗∗ (∗) are significantly different from 0 at the 1% (5%) level.
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panel 2 than in panel 1. A more standard feature of a subject’s risk attitude (risk aversion in MON-
terms) is captured by q¯, the subject’s average choice over the four panels —see descriptive statistics of
these variables in Table 8. In Table 9 we present three estimations constructed to assess the impact of
MON-compliance and risk aversion.25 Following equations (7) and (8), the specification for the mean
and the dispersion of prices is given in the next two equations
Θi = Λ(θ1T1i + θ2T2i + · · ·+ θ8T8i + θr ln ri) (10)
∆i = exp(δ1T1i + δ2T2i + · · ·+ δ8T8i + δr ln ri) (11)
where Tti is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if observation i corresponds to treatment t and 0
otherwhise and ri is a measure of the degree of risk aversion of the setter of price i. We define ri as the
average choice made in the parallel experiment discussed above normalized so that it takes a value of 1
for subjects that choose q = 0.1 in the four panels, i. e., ri = q¯i/0.1. For such subjects we use the term
risk neutral throughout the text.26
Observation 10 Subjects’ risk attitudes significantly affect the observed pricing behavior.
Under the heading Model I in Table 9, we present estimates of the simplest model in which only
treatment variables, T1i, . . . , T8i, are included. Comparison with Model II of Table 9 shows that the
risk aversion variable improves the fit. The θr parameter indicates a significant negative relationship
between the mean and ri but a non-significant impact on the dispersion estimate. Model III of Table 9
extends Model II by allowing for differences in the parameters of price distributions forMON and non-
MON subjects. We find significant differences between the two sets of parameter estimates and that
the split into two subsamples significantly improves the overall fit. The likelihood ratio tests statistics
strongly reject Model I and Model II in favor of Model III. Risk aversion turns out to significantly affect
both the mean and the dispersion of price distributions for non-MON subjects only, indicating a non-
negligible interaction betweenMON-compliance and risk aversion.
Observation 11 (i) Risk neutral non-MON subjects tend to set higher prices, which exhibit a lower dispersion,
than MON subjects. (ii) For non-MON subjets, a higher degree of risk aversion tends to lower prices and to
increase dispersion.
25The results of this section are generated using a program written for Ox version 3.30 (Doornik (2002)).
26Note that this is done for labelling purposes, given that choosing q = 0.1 is also compatible with risk-loving behavior as well
as with some, arbitrarily low, degree of risk-aversion.
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The first conclusion is based on the rejection of equality of the parameters for MON and non-MON
subjects, and on the observation that θ1, . . . , θ8 and δ1, . . . , δ8 parameter estimates take higher values for
non-MON subjects. The second conclusion follows from the significant negative estimates of θr and δr
parameters for non-MON subjects.
The reported heterogeneity of subjects with respect to risk attitudes can explain the rotation of em-
pirical price distributions discussed in Observation 1. The presence of non-MON subjects increases
probability mass on both high and low prices. On one hand, risk neutral non-MON subjects shift prob-
ability mass from lower to higher prices. On the other hand, risk averse non-MON subjects shift prob-
ability mass from higher to lower prices. The varying patterns of rotations found in Figure 5 can be
explained by differences across treatments in the proportion of non-MON subjects and their degrees of
risk aversion.
So far, our analysis concerns treatment dummies. However, treatments are designed using different
parameters of the model’s variables. Therefore, we can also estimate an alternative model whose ex-
planatory terms are specific to these design variables. We use the following specifications for the mean
and the dispersion of price distributions:
Θi = Λ(θ0 + θuk (1− bi) ln ki + θun(1− bi) ln ni + θbkbi ln ki + θbnbi ln ni + θr ln ri) (12)
∆i = exp(δ0 + δuk (1− bi) ln ki + δun(1− bi) ln ni + δbkbi ln ki + δbnbi ln ni + δr ln ri) (13)
where ki is the size of the index, ni is the number of firms and bi is a dummy variable taking a value
of 1 for observations corresponding to biased treatments and 0 otherwise.27 All other notation is the
same as before. As the Complete Coverage case can be thought as a limit case of both Biased and Unbiased
Incomplete Coverage we impose the additional restrictions θuk + θ
u
n = θ
b
k + θ
b
n and δuk + δ
u
n = δ
b
k + δ
b
n.
This restriction guarantees that, when n = k, the price distributions for Unbiased and Biased Incomplete
Coverage collapse to a common distribution, corresponding toComplete Coverage, but still allows different
patterns of influence of n and k on the Incomplete Coverage cases.
Table 10 reports estimates of the parameters in equations (12) and (13). Again, likelihood ratio test
statistics reject the simpler Model IV and Model V in favor of the more general Model VI, that accounts
for differences in the compliance of the monotonicity hypothesis and for varying degrees of risk aver-
sion. Like before, homogeneity between MON and non-MON subjects is rejected. In Model VI, except
27We have tried more complex specifications including squares and interactions of the regressors. But that increased complexity
hardly improved the estimation results.
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TABLE 10: Price Distribution as a Function of the Model’s Parameters
Model IV Model V Model VI
All subjects All subjects MON non-MON
θ0 0.894
[0.081]
∗∗ 1.339
[0.097]
∗∗ 0.765
[0.142]
∗∗ 2.053
[0.145]
∗∗
θuk −0.300[0.047]
∗∗ −0.341
[0.047]
∗∗ −0.213
[0.059]
∗∗ −0.347
[0.097]
∗∗
θun 0.234
[0.062]
∗∗ 0.255
[0.062]
∗∗ 0.320
[0.078]
∗∗ 0.339
[0.106]
∗∗
θbk 1.056[0.086]
∗∗ 1.140
[0.087]
∗∗ 0.817
[0.105]
∗∗ 1.446
[0.159]
∗∗
θbn −1.122
[0.108]
∗∗ −1.225
[0.108]
∗∗ −0.710
[0.136]
∗∗ −1.454
[0.227]
∗∗
θr −0.270
[0.040]
∗∗ −0.071
[0.049]
−0.766
[0.089]
∗∗
δ0 1.202
[0.059]
∗∗ 1.279
[0.074]
∗∗ 1.014
[0.102]
∗∗ 1.792
[0.120]
∗∗
δuk −0.285[0.031]
∗∗ −0.289
[0.032]
∗∗ −0.244
[0.039]
∗∗ −0.161
[0.070]
∗
δun −0.547
[0.040]
∗∗ −0.525
[0.041]
∗∗ −0.495
[0.049]
∗∗ −0.464
[0.084]
∗∗
δbk 0.359[0.096]
∗∗ 0.396
[0.098]
∗∗ 0.310
[0.116]
∗ 0.310
[0.177]
δbn −1.190
[0.112]
∗∗ −1.210
[0.115]
∗∗ −1.049
[0.141]
∗∗ −0.935
[0.218]
∗∗
δr −0.059
[0.025]
∗ 0.022
[0.027]
−0.434
[0.084]
∗∗
RMSE 0.325 0.323 0.322
ln L 3192.3 3207.9 3231.0
LR 77.4∗∗ 46.2∗∗
K 8 10 20
Maximum-likelihood estimates of parameters in equations (12) and (13). White’s (1982) robust standard errors between brack-
ets. Sample size is 3600 observations. RMSE is the root mean squared prediction error, ln L is the value of the likelihood
function, LR is the likelihood ratio statistic comparing each Model with Model III, K is the number of parameters estimated in
each model. Coefficients marked with ∗∗ (∗) are significantly different from 0 at the 1% (5%) level.
37
for three estimates, all parameters are significant and have the same sign for both types of subjects. Like
in the previous models, our risk measure is only significant and negative for non-MON subjects.
The estimated parameters in Table 10 imply that an increase in the number of firms decreases the
expected prices of those firms indexed by biased search engines and increases the expected prices of
firms that could be indexed by an unbiased search engine. While the former observations agrees with
the theoretical predictions, the latter do not. The estimated effects of a change in the index size are in
line with the theoretical predictions: an increase of ki rises the expected price in biased treatments and
lowers the expected price in unbiased treatments.
An advantage of our estimation procedure is that we can extrapolate the results in order to predict
behavior under different conditions. An example is presented in Tables 11 and 12, where we provide
predictions for two interesting scenarios: risk neutrality and “average risk aversion”, corresponding
to the most frequent choice in the parallel experiment (q = 0.5).28 For risk neutrality, results confirm
the comments above: non-MON subjects set higher prices with a lower standard deviation. This is
also valid for minimum prices. However, these results are often reversed when we calculate moments
for risk averse subjects. In three of the eight treatments the means of average and minimum prices,
evaluated at the average risk aversion degree, are higher forMON than for non-MON subjects.
The results in Table 11 also allow us to check the testable hypotheses of section 5.3.29 Amajor finding
is that some hypotheses are confirmed independently from the subjects’ attitudes towards risk. Specif-
ically, hypotheses HU1 (i), HB2 and HU2 are confirmed in all cases. The HC hypothesis is confirmed
strongly forMON subjects and weakly for non-MON ones. A second set of hypotheses are those which
are confirmed by a certain subject type alone. Specifically, HB1 (i) is confirmed by non-MON subjects
and HB1 (ii) is confirmed by MON subjects. Also, the HG (i) hypothesis is not confirmed by MON
subjects. Finally,HU1 (ii) is not confirmed by any type of subjects.
An overview of these tables shows that some general features like, for example our consistency
hypothesis, are supported in the majority of the cases. This implies that the predictions of models
like Varian (1980), derived under assumptions of risk neutrality are robust enough to survive in the
presence of risk-averse subjects. Other results require more qualified testing in that the existence of
28Once an estimation of the distribution of prices is obtained, it is straightforward to estimate the mean and the variance of
average prices, e = ∑ pi/n, as long as E(e) = E(p) and Var(e) = Var(p)/n. The distribution function for the minimum of n
prices is 1− (1− F(·))n, where F is the cumulative distribution function of p. Using this result, we can calculate the mean and
the variance of minimum prices.
29Appendix C offers an exhaustive map of predictions concerning our testable hypotheses for different values of n and k.
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TABLE 11: Means of Price Distributions
Treatment Average prices Minimum prices
MON non-MON MON non-MON
(a) Risk neutrality
1 0.707 0.885 0.436 0.754
2 0.725 0.899 0.568 0.830
3 0.634 0.811 0.447 0.704
4 0.722 0.885 0.230 0.607
5 0.739 0.898 0.371 0.716
6 0.652 0.810 0.241 0.543
7 0.767 0.918 0.613 0.856
8 0.515 0.611 0.288 0.432
(b) Average risk aversion
1 0.683 0.693 0.407 0.432
2 0.701 0.722 0.539 0.570
3 0.608 0.556 0.418 0.369
4 0.699 0.691 0.206 0.224
5 0.717 0.721 0.342 0.365
6 0.625 0.555 0.215 0.169
7 0.746 0.766 0.585 0.618
8 0.486 0.314 0.260 0.123
Means of average and minimum price distributions calculated from the results of last two columns of Table 10.
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TABLE 12: Standard Deviations of Price Distributions
Treatment Average prices Minimum prices
MON non-MON MON non-MON
(a) Risk neutrality
1 0.305 0.159 0.290 0.193
2 0.291 0.147 0.300 0.173
3 0.334 0.209 0.317 0.220
4 0.340 0.186 0.253 0.238
5 0.326 0.172 0.311 0.229
6 0.371 0.237 0.281 0.257
7 0.302 0.150 0.331 0.185
8 0.405 0.315 0.342 0.290
(b) Average risk aversion
1 0.309 0.292 0.281 0.268
2 0.295 0.278 0.297 0.283
3 0.336 0.326 0.310 0.283
4 0.346 0.329 0.235 0.221
5 0.332 0.314 0.298 0.283
6 0.375 0.365 0.263 0.213
7 0.308 0.288 0.330 0.312
8 0.400 0.357 0.327 0.221
Standard deviations of average and minimum price distributions calculated from the results of last two columns of Table 10.
40
MON-incompatible behavior and lack of neutrality towards risk induces two directions in which ob-
served behavior may deviate from theory. First, a subject alone may not be risk-neutral. Second, even
MON-compatible risk neutral subjects could be interacting with other types of agents whose behavior
-if anticipated by the former- induces everybody in the market act contrary to what the theory pre-
dicts. We could summarize and attempt a synthesis of the preceding results, observing that generally
speaking, failures of the theoretical model to organize observed behavior relate to Unbiased Incomplete
Coverage, obviously, because this setting implies an extra source of uncertainty (whether one will be
actually indexed or not) for interacting sellers.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a theoretical model on the effects of incompleteness and bias of
price-comparison search engines on the market outcome. We tested the theoretical predictions in a
laboratory experiment whose design is specific to the testable hypotheses emerging from the model.
Furthermore, we implemented a parallel experiment, designed to capture two different aspects of our
subjects’ attitude towards risk: the degree of risk aversion and wheter subjects accept riskier options in
exchange for a higher return. The experimental data were used for the estimation of two versions of a
specific econometric model. The first version accounts for the fixed effects corresponding to the eight
experimental treatments through dummy variables. The second version accounts for the design vari-
ables in their quantitative form. Both models are significantly improved when two risk related variables
are included as idiosyncratic subject specific shocks. Further hypotheses are tested by simulation results
obtained on the estimates of the econometric model.
The theoretical model warns us on possible counterintuitive effects of unbiased coverage of the mar-
ket on observed prices, e.g., a larger number of firms whose prices are included in the engine may not
imply globally lower expected prices. However, experimental results contradict some of the theoretical
predictions both in quantitative and qualitative terms, especially, predictions on incomplete coverage.
An interesting empirical finding reported here concerns an important improvement in the explanatory
power of the empirical model of individual prices, which is obtained when we introduce the variables
accounting for our subjects’ attitudes towards risk. Specifically, splitting the sample of subjects into
two groups according to whether they comply or not with the monotonicity hypothesis improves the
explanatory power of the empirical model. Furthermore, a significant negative effect of risk aversion on
prices is estimated for those not fulfilling monotonicity. This and the risk-related aspects of our subjects’
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behavior explain the systematic clock-wise rotation of observed price distributions as compared to the
theoretical ones.
Our findings indicate that behavioral factors are important in markets like the ones studied here.
Therefore, models assuming monotonicity or risk neutrality may produce predictions which deviate
from behavior by real agents.
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Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: For τ = b and j = k + 1, . . . , n the proofs are obvious, so consider: (a) τ = b and
j = 1, . . . , k, and (b) τ = c, u.
(i) For any j, any price pj < lτj or pj > 1 is strictly dominated by pj = 1;
(ii) Suppose not, i.e., suppose that Fτj has a mass point at price p. Let ε > 0 be arbitrarily small and
such that no mass point exists at price p− ε. The expected profits of firm j are:
Πj(p− ε) = (p− ε)λn + (p− ε)(1−λ)φ
τ
j Prob[p− ε < pˆ−j] + (p− ε)(1−λ)φτj Prob[p− ε ≤ p = pˆ−j]
and
Πj(p) = p
λ
n
+ p(1− λ)φτj Prob[p < pˆ−j] + p
(1− λ)φτj
mˆ−j
Prob[p = pˆj−i]
Subtracting the second expression from the first and taking the limit as e approached zero, one
obtains
lim
ε→0
[Πj(p− ε)−Πj(p)] = pα(1− λ)φτj
(
mˆ−j − 1
mˆ−j
)
Prob[p = pˆ−j] > 0
Hence, vendor j would increase profit by shifting mass from p to an ε neighborhood below p. But
this implies that it cannot be an equilibrium strategy to maintain a mass point at p;
(iii) Suppose not, i.e, suppose p¯j < 1. Then
Πj( p¯j) = p¯j
λ
n
+ p¯j(1− λ)φτj [1− F( p¯j)]k−1 = p¯j
λ
n
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since fom (ii) there are no mass points at p¯jλ/n. However, the payoff from setting a price equal to
1 is λ/n > p¯jλ/n;
(iv) Follows from (ii) and (iii);
(v) Parts (ii) and (iv) imply that
¯
pjλ/n+
¯
pj(1− λ)φτj = Πj(
¯
pj) = λ/n. Hence
¯
pj = lτj ;
(vi) Suppose not, i.e., suppose there is an interval [pl , ph] satisfying lτj ≤ pl < ph ≤ 1 such that F(pl) =
F(ph). Suppose also that pl is the infimum of all prices p, lτj ≤ p ≤ 1. Then pl is in the support of
F(·) and, from (ii) Π?j = Πj(pl) = plλ/n+ pl(1− λ)φτj [1− F(pl)]k−1 < phλ/n+ ph(1− λ)φτj [1−
F(ph)]k−1 = Πj(ph), a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 1: We show constructively that equilibrium exists. Alternatively, existence fol-
lows from theorem 5 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). (i) Use Lemma 1(iv) to set Πj(p) = pλ/n+ p(1−
λ)φτj [1− F(p)]k−1 = λ/n. Solving for F(p) the result follows; (ii) Obvious. 
Proof of Remark 1: (i) Follows from the fact that all firms are indifferent between any equilibrium
price and the monopoly price. (ii) Follows directly from the defintion of µc = lc +
∫ 1
lc (1− Fc)ndp and
εc = lc +
∫ 1
lc (1− Fc)dp. 
Theorem 1 (i) εc(n) < εc(n+ 1); (ii) µc(n) > µc(n+ 1). §
Proof of Theorem 1: (i) See Morgan et al. (2004); (ii) Follows from (i) and Remark 1(i). 
Proof of Corollary 1: Obvious. 
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) Obvious; (ii) Follows from Corollary 1 and the Theorem 1; (iii) Obvious.

Proof of Corollary 2: (i) Obvious; (ii) Follows from Corollary 1 and the Theorem 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) Obvious; (ii) Follows from (i); (iii) Obvious; (iv) Follows from (iii). 
Proof of Corollary 3: (i) Obvious; (ii) Obvious; (iii) Follows from (ii); (iv) Follows from (ii). 
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Appendix B Instructions of the Experiment (Translated from Spanish)
• The purpose of this experiment is to study how subjects take decisions in specific economic con-
texts. This project has received financial support by public funds. Your decision making in this
session is going to be of great importance for the success of this research on economic phenomena.
At the end of the session you will receive a quantity of money in cash which will depend on your
performance during the session.
• The environment in which the experiment takes place is an industry. This industry can be charac-
terized as follows:
(a) a price comparison search engine like the ones on the Internet,
(b) 3 firms, (Treatments 4–8: 6 firms),
(c) 1 200 consumers.
Each firm in the industry produces a homogeneous product, and this product is the same for all
firms.
• Transactions will take place in UMEX (our lab’s Experimental Monetary Units).
• Each session will consists of 50 rounds.
• You are one of the 3 firms (Treatmens 4–8: 6 firms) in the industry. Your production costs are zero.
Therefore, your profits are equal to your income.
• Each round, you and the rest of the firms in the industry have to decide the price at which you
want to sell the product. Price is your only decision variable.
• (Treatments 1 and 4) Each period, the Price Search Engine lists the price of all firms in the industry.
• (Treatments 2, 5 and 7) Each period, the Price Search Engine lists the price of 2 firms (Treatment 5:
4 firms) in the industry. More precisely, each round, the price comparison search engine randomly
chooses 2 firms (Treatment 5: 4 firms), whose price will be included in its price list. The identity
of the firms whose price will be included in the list of the price search engine, will be announced
publicly to the members of the industry after the firms’ price decision making.
• (Treatments 3, 6 and 8) Each period, the Price Search Engine lists the price of 2 firms (Treatment 6:
4 firms) in the industry. More precisely, each round, the price comparison search engine randomly
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chooses 2 firms (Treatment 6: 4 firms), whose price will be included in its price list. The identity
of the firms whose price will be included in the list of the price search engine, will be announced
publicly to the members of the industry before the firms’ price decision making.
• Each consumer wants to buy one unit of the product per round. The maximumwillingness to pay
of each consumer for a unit of the product is 1 000 UMEX. That is, if the price you fix is higher than
1 000 UMEX, nobody will buy from you.
• There are two types of consumers. Half of them, i.e. 600 consumers, will read the list of price
created by the search engine. The other half do not actually read the list of prices of the search
engine (maybe because they are not able to do so).
• The consumers who read the price list of the search engine will buy, each period, from the firm
whose price for that period is the lowest among all prices included in the price list, if such price does
not exceed 1 000 UMEX. In case of a “tie” (i.e., several firms fix the same minimum price) the
consumers are distributed equitatively among the firms with the same minimum price.
• The consumers that do not read the search engine’s price list will buy “randomly” from any ven-
dor, so that the total demand of this group of consumers will be distributed equitatively among
all firms in the industry.
• In each round, the other 2 firms (Treatments 4–8: 5 firms) which (together with you) form the in-
dustry, will be randomly assigned among all participants. Therefore, the probability of competing
with the same 2 firms (Treatments 4–8: 5 firms) in 2 different periods is very low (less than 10%).
• Once the participants have been assigned to the industries, you must decide your price. The
master program in the computer will simulate the consumers’ reactions. At the end of each round,
you will see on your screen the information about your own sales, your earnings and the prices
fixed by your competitors in the market.
• At the end of the session you will be paid in cash. Your reward will be determined taking into
account the earnings you accumulate over 10 (randomly selected) out of the total 50 periods. The
exchange rate will be: 1 000 000 UMEX = 10 €.
Thank you very much for your participation. Good luck!
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Appendix C Additional Results
TABLE 13: Means of price distributions (MON, unbiased)
(a) Average prices, risk neutrality
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.725 0.707
n = 4 0.743 0.726 0.714
n = 5 0.756 0.740 0.728 0.719
n = 6 0.767 0.751 0.739 0.730 0.722
n = 7 0.776 0.760 0.749 0.740 0.732 0.726
n = 8 0.783 0.768 0.757 0.748 0.741 0.734 0.729
(b) Minimum prices, risk neutrality
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.568 0.436
n = 4 0.586 0.451 0.351
n = 5 0.601 0.464 0.362 0.284
n = 6 0.613 0.476 0.371 0.291 0.230
n = 7 0.623 0.485 0.380 0.298 0.235 0.187
n = 8 0.632 0.494 0.387 0.304 0.240 0.190 0.152
(c) Average prices, average risk aversion
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.701 0.683
n = 4 0.720 0.703 0.690
n = 5 0.735 0.717 0.705 0.695
n = 6 0.746 0.729 0.717 0.707 0.699
n = 7 0.755 0.739 0.727 0.717 0.709 0.702
n = 8 0.763 0.747 0.735 0.726 0.718 0.711 0.705
(d) Minimum prices, average risk aversion
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.539 0.407
n = 4 0.558 0.422 0.324
n = 5 0.573 0.434 0.333 0.258
n = 6 0.585 0.445 0.342 0.264 0.206
n = 7 0.595 0.455 0.350 0.270 0.211 0.165
n = 8 0.605 0.464 0.357 0.276 0.215 0.168 0.132
Means of average and minimum price distributions calculated from the estimates of Table 10.
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TABLE 14: Means of price distributions (MON, biased)
(a) Average prices, risk neutrality
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.634 0.707
n = 4 0.586 0.663 0.714
n = 5 0.547 0.627 0.680 0.719
n = 6 0.515 0.596 0.652 0.692 0.722
n = 7 0.488 0.570 0.626 0.668 0.700 0.726
n = 8 0.464 0.547 0.604 0.647 0.680 0.707 0.729
(b) Minimum prices, risk neutrality
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.447 0.436
n = 4 0.379 0.359 0.351
n = 5 0.328 0.300 0.289 0.284
n = 6 0.288 0.256 0.241 0.234 0.230
n = 7 0.256 0.220 0.203 0.194 0.189 0.187
n = 8 0.230 0.192 0.173 0.163 0.157 0.154 0.152
(c) Average prices, average risk aversion
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.608 0.683
n = 4 0.558 0.637 0.690
n = 5 0.519 0.600 0.655 0.695
n = 6 0.486 0.569 0.625 0.667 0.699
n = 7 0.459 0.542 0.599 0.642 0.675 0.702
n = 8 0.436 0.518 0.576 0.620 0.654 0.682 0.705
(d) Minimum prices, average risk aversion
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.418 0.407
n = 4 0.349 0.330 0.324
n = 5 0.299 0.272 0.262 0.258
n = 6 0.260 0.229 0.215 0.209 0.206
n = 7 0.230 0.195 0.179 0.171 0.167 0.165
n = 8 0.205 0.168 0.151 0.141 0.136 0.134 0.132
Means of average and minimum price distributions calculated from the estimates of Table 10.
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TABLE 15: Means of price distributions (non-MON, unbiased)
(a) Average prices, risk neutrality
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.899 0.885
n = 4 0.907 0.895 0.885
n = 5 0.914 0.902 0.893 0.885
n = 6 0.918 0.907 0.898 0.891 0.885
n = 7 0.922 0.911 0.903 0.896 0.890 0.885
n = 8 0.925 0.915 0.907 0.900 0.894 0.889 0.885
(b) Minimum prices, risk neutrality
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.830 0.754
n = 4 0.841 0.766 0.700
n = 5 0.849 0.775 0.709 0.652
n = 6 0.856 0.782 0.716 0.659 0.607
n = 7 0.861 0.788 0.723 0.665 0.613 0.567
n = 8 0.866 0.794 0.729 0.670 0.618 0.571 0.529
(c) Average prices, average risk aversion
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.722 0.693
n = 4 0.741 0.713 0.692
n = 5 0.755 0.728 0.708 0.692
n = 6 0.766 0.740 0.721 0.705 0.691
n = 7 0.776 0.750 0.731 0.715 0.702 0.691
n = 8 0.783 0.759 0.740 0.725 0.712 0.701 0.691
(d) Minimum prices, average risk aversion
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.570 0.432
n = 4 0.590 0.448 0.346
n = 5 0.605 0.461 0.356 0.278
n = 6 0.618 0.473 0.365 0.285 0.224
n = 7 0.628 0.483 0.373 0.291 0.228 0.181
n = 8 0.638 0.492 0.381 0.296 0.233 0.184 0.146
Means of average and minimum price distributions calculated from the estimates of Table 10.
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TABLE 16: Means of price distributions (non-MON, biased)
(a) Average prices, risk neutrality
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.811 0.885
n = 4 0.739 0.836 0.885
n = 5 0.672 0.786 0.848 0.885
n = 6 0.611 0.738 0.810 0.855 0.885
n = 7 0.556 0.693 0.774 0.825 0.860 0.885
n = 8 0.508 0.650 0.738 0.795 0.835 0.863 0.885
(b) Minimum prices, risk neutrality
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.704 0.754
n = 4 0.602 0.661 0.700
n = 5 0.510 0.574 0.619 0.652
n = 6 0.432 0.495 0.543 0.579 0.607
n = 7 0.365 0.425 0.473 0.511 0.542 0.567
n = 8 0.308 0.363 0.410 0.449 0.481 0.507 0.529
(c) Average prices, average risk aversion
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.556 0.693
n = 4 0.452 0.597 0.692
n = 5 0.374 0.517 0.619 0.692
n = 6 0.314 0.451 0.555 0.632 0.691
n = 7 0.268 0.397 0.499 0.579 0.642 0.691
n = 8 0.232 0.351 0.451 0.531 0.596 0.648 0.691
(d) Minimum prices, average risk aversion
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.369 0.432
n = 4 0.252 0.300 0.346
n = 5 0.174 0.206 0.243 0.278
n = 6 0.123 0.142 0.169 0.197 0.224
n = 7 0.089 0.098 0.117 0.138 0.160 0.181
n = 8 0.066 0.069 0.081 0.096 0.113 0.130 0.146
Means of average and minimum price distributions calculated from the estimates of Table 10.
51
TABLE 17: Standard deviations of price distributions (MON, unbiased)
(a) Average prices, risk neutrality
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.291 0.305
n = 4 0.297 0.311 0.321
n = 5 0.300 0.314 0.324 0.332
n = 6 0.302 0.316 0.326 0.334 0.340
n = 7 0.304 0.318 0.328 0.336 0.342 0.347
n = 8 0.305 0.319 0.329 0.337 0.343 0.348 0.352
(b) Minimum prices, risk neutrality
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.300 0.290
n = 4 0.314 0.307 0.284
n = 5 0.324 0.321 0.299 0.270
n = 6 0.331 0.331 0.311 0.283 0.253
n = 7 0.337 0.340 0.321 0.293 0.263 0.233
n = 8 0.342 0.348 0.330 0.303 0.272 0.242 0.213
(c) Average prices, average risk aversion
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.295 0.309
n = 4 0.302 0.315 0.325
n = 5 0.306 0.320 0.329 0.337
n = 6 0.308 0.322 0.332 0.340 0.346
n = 7 0.310 0.324 0.334 0.342 0.348 0.353
n = 8 0.312 0.326 0.336 0.343 0.349 0.355 0.359
(d) Minimum prices, average risk aversion
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.297 0.281
n = 4 0.311 0.299 0.271
n = 5 0.322 0.312 0.286 0.255
n = 6 0.330 0.324 0.298 0.267 0.235
n = 7 0.337 0.333 0.309 0.277 0.245 0.214
n = 8 0.342 0.341 0.318 0.287 0.254 0.222 0.193
Standard deviations of average and minimum price distributions calculated from the estimates of Table 10.
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TABLE 18: Standard deviations of price distributions (MON, biased)
(a) Average prices, risk neutrality
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.334 0.305
n = 4 0.367 0.342 0.321
n = 5 0.390 0.369 0.349 0.332
n = 6 0.405 0.389 0.371 0.355 0.340
n = 7 0.416 0.404 0.389 0.374 0.360 0.347
n = 8 0.424 0.415 0.402 0.389 0.376 0.364 0.352
(b) Minimum prices, risk neutrality
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.317 0.290
n = 4 0.335 0.304 0.284
n = 5 0.341 0.307 0.286 0.270
n = 6 0.342 0.305 0.281 0.265 0.253
n = 7 0.340 0.299 0.273 0.256 0.243 0.233
n = 8 0.336 0.292 0.264 0.245 0.231 0.221 0.213
(c) Average prices, average risk aversion
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.336 0.309
n = 4 0.367 0.345 0.325
n = 5 0.389 0.371 0.353 0.337
n = 6 0.403 0.390 0.375 0.360 0.346
n = 7 0.412 0.404 0.391 0.378 0.365 0.353
n = 8 0.419 0.415 0.404 0.392 0.381 0.369 0.359
(d) Minimum prices, average risk aversion
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.310 0.281
n = 4 0.324 0.292 0.271
n = 5 0.328 0.292 0.270 0.255
n = 6 0.327 0.288 0.263 0.247 0.235
n = 7 0.324 0.281 0.254 0.236 0.224 0.214
n = 8 0.318 0.272 0.244 0.225 0.211 0.201 0.193
Standard deviations of average and minimum price distributions calculated from the estimates of Table 10.
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TABLE 19: Standard deviations of price distributions (non-MON, unbiased)
(a) Average prices, risk neutrality
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.147 0.159
n = 4 0.148 0.161 0.170
n = 5 0.149 0.162 0.171 0.179
n = 6 0.150 0.163 0.172 0.179 0.186
n = 7 0.150 0.163 0.172 0.180 0.186 0.192
n = 8 0.151 0.163 0.173 0.180 0.187 0.192 0.197
(b) Minimum prices, risk neutrality
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.173 0.193
n = 4 0.178 0.202 0.213
n = 5 0.182 0.209 0.222 0.228
n = 6 0.185 0.214 0.229 0.236 0.238
n = 7 0.187 0.218 0.235 0.243 0.246 0.245
n = 8 0.189 0.222 0.240 0.249 0.252 0.252 0.249
(c) Average prices, average risk aversion
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.278 0.292
n = 4 0.283 0.297 0.307
n = 5 0.286 0.301 0.311 0.319
n = 6 0.288 0.303 0.314 0.322 0.329
n = 7 0.289 0.305 0.316 0.325 0.331 0.337
n = 8 0.290 0.306 0.318 0.326 0.333 0.338 0.343
(d) Minimum prices, average risk aversion
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.283 0.268
n = 4 0.296 0.284 0.257
n = 5 0.305 0.297 0.271 0.241
n = 6 0.312 0.307 0.283 0.252 0.221
n = 7 0.318 0.316 0.293 0.262 0.231 0.201
n = 8 0.322 0.324 0.301 0.271 0.239 0.209 0.181
Standard deviations of average and minimum price distributions calculated from the estimates of Table 10.
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TABLE 20: Standard deviations of price distributions (non-MON, biased)
(a) Average prices, risk neutrality
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.204 0.159
n = 4 0.252 0.204 0.170
n = 5 0.288 0.242 0.206 0.179
n = 6 0.315 0.274 0.237 0.209 0.186
n = 7 0.335 0.300 0.265 0.236 0.211 0.192
n = 8 0.348 0.321 0.289 0.260 0.235 0.214 0.197
(b) Minimum prices, risk neutrality
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.220 0.193
n = 4 0.258 0.231 0.213
n = 5 0.279 0.256 0.240 0.228
n = 6 0.290 0.270 0.257 0.246 0.238
n = 7 0.292 0.276 0.266 0.258 0.251 0.245
n = 8 0.288 0.276 0.269 0.263 0.258 0.253 0.249
(c) Average prices, average risk aversion
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.326 0.292
n = 4 0.351 0.335 0.307
n = 5 0.358 0.360 0.342 0.319
n = 6 0.357 0.372 0.365 0.348 0.329
n = 7 0.350 0.377 0.379 0.368 0.353 0.337
n = 8 0.341 0.377 0.387 0.382 0.372 0.358 0.343
(d) Minimum prices, average risk aversion
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
n = 3 0.283 0.268
n = 4 0.271 0.261 0.257
n = 5 0.247 0.239 0.239 0.241
n = 6 0.221 0.211 0.213 0.217 0.221
n = 7 0.197 0.183 0.184 0.189 0.195 0.201
n = 8 0.175 0.158 0.157 0.162 0.168 0.175 0.181
Standard deviations of average and minimum price distributions calculated from the estimates of Table 10.
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